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Introduction
Mosaic theory is a research methodology used in various different
contexts based upon piecing together bits of available information to
draw conclusions about an entity or a phenomenon. 1 Although the term
†

Professor of Law, The University of Toledo College of Law; J.D., University
of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., The Ohio State University. This Article
benefited from discussions with scholars too numerous to mention. I would
like to offer thanks to Professors Jonathan H. Adler, A.C. Pritchard, Lee
Strang, and Evan Zoldan for providing feedback and advice that contributed
greatly to this Article. I would also like to offer special thanks to Professor
Jonathan H. Adler and the editorial board of the Case Western Reserve Law
Review for inviting me to contribute to this symposium issue. As always, I
would like to express my appreciation to Christine Gall, Esq. for her encouragement while drafting this work. The views set forth in this Article are
completely my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of any employer
or client either past or present.

1.

See Bradley J. Bondi & Steven D. Lofchie, The Law of Insider Trading:
Legal Theories, Common Defenses, and Best Practices for Ensuring Compliance, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 151, 154–55 (2011) (“[I]nstitutional investors,
such as hedge funds, often piece together bits of public and nonpublic, nonmaterial information to understand the broader position of a particular
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“mosaic theory” is a relatively recent entrant into the intelligence gathering lexicon, it describes the process that has been used by scholars
studying the Supreme Court of the United States throughout the existence of that body. In regard to the Supreme Court, however, analogizing understanding the Court to viewing a mosaic is not a perfect description. While a mosaic is a picture or pattern created by an arrangement of smaller pieces, understanding the Court involves analyzing a
rich tapestry of interwoven precedent, judicial theory, history, and
individual personalities. One must look at the strands that compose the
tapestry, how those strands are interconnected, and the patterns that
have emerged to understand the role of the Court in American democracy and American history.
Although the portion of the tapestry known as the “Roberts Court”
is not yet complete, important patterns have begun to emerge. This is
especially true in the area of securities regulation. As a result, analysis
can and should be done.
The number of opinions that have been handed down so far relating
to securities law is substantial. Since Chief Justice Roberts began his
tenure on September 29, 2005, 2 the Court has authored roughly twentyone opinions relating to securities regulation. 3 Notably, deciding which
company. This practice is commonly referred to as the ‘mosaic’ theory of
investing . . . .”); Jonathan Hafetz, Calling the Government to Account:
Habeas Corpus in the Aftermath of Boumediene, 57 Wayne L. Rev. 99, 124
(2011) (“Originally employed in intelligence-analysis, the mosaic theory is
premised on the notion that pieces of evidence must be evaluated as a whole
rather than examined independently.”); David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic
Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information Act, 115 Yale
L.J. 628, 630 (2005) (“The ‘mosaic theory’ describes a basic precept of
intelligence gathering: Disparate items of information, though individually of
limited or no utility to their possessor, can take on added significance when
combined with other items of information.”); Christina E. Wells, CIA v. Sims:
Mosaic Theory and Government Attitude, 58 Admin. L. Rev. 845, 853
(2006) (“[M]osaic theory is a theory of informational synergy in which
intelligence agencies convert independently innocuous information into
potentially significant intelligence information.”).
2.

See Biographies of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, Sup. Ct. U.S.,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx [https://perma.cc/
T7Q5-6LYX] (last visited Feb. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Biographies of Current
Justices] (referencing the date President George W. Bush appointed Chief
Justice John Roberts).

3.

See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016); Omnicare, Inc. v.
Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015);
Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398
(2014); Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014); Chadbourne & Parke
LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &
Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct 1216 (2013);
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012); Janus
Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011); Erica
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cases to include on this list is controversial because one of the cases had
certiorari granted before Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court, 4 which
creates a question as to which version of the Court to assign it, and two
cases focus on issues that are outside the traditional realm of securities
regulation. 5 Moreover, two additional cases were dismissed prior to
judgment, which requires a decision as to what granting certiorari in
those cases means. 6 This Article takes an all-inclusive approach.
Importantly, regardless of how narrow an approach is employed,
the number of cases seems to erroneously reflect a deep and pervasive
interest by the Court in securities regulation issues. The Roberts Court
has taken approximately two securities regulation cases per term, which
is twice the number that the Rehnquist Court took. 7 Moreover, the
number of cases granted certiorari continues to shrink, which means
that securities regulation cases represent an even larger portion of the
Court’s docket. 8 But the opinions themselves tell a different story with
P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804 (2011);
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27 (2011); Free Enter. Fund
v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010); Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559
U.S. 633 (2010); Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010); Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008); Tellabs,
Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Credit Suisse Sec.
(USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Kircher v. Putnam Funds Tr.,
547 U.S. 633 (2006); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit,
547 U.S. 71 (2006).
4.

See Order Granting Certiorari, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.
v. Dabit, 545 U.S. 1164 (2005) (granting certiorari in Dabit two days before
Chief Justice Roberts joined the Court).

5.

See infra Part I.D (discussing the opinions by the Roberts Court relating
to securities law that are on the outer limits of securities regulation).

6.

See Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 42
(2014) (dismissing the writ of certiorari for being “improvidently granted”);
UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R. v. Union de Empleados de Muelles de P.R.
PRSSA Welfare Plan, 134 S. Ct. 40 (2013) (dismissing the petition at the
agreement of the parties).

7.

A.C. Pritchard, Securities Law in the Roberts Court: Agenda or Indifference?, 37 J. Corp. L. 105, 107 (2011) (explaining that the Roberts Court
has on average taken two cases relating to securities regulation per term,
while the Rehnquist Court took only one).

8.

See Jason Iuliano & Ya Sheng Lin, Supreme Court Repeaters, 69 Vand. L.
Rev. 1349, 1356 (2016) (“[T]he total number of cases decided by the Supreme Court has declined by more than fifty percent over the last ninety
years.”); Hillel Y. Levin, A Reliance Approach to Precedent, 47 Ga. L. Rev.
1035, 1047–48 (2013) (“In contrast to the federal intermediate appellate courts,
which consider tens of thousands of cases each year, the Supreme Court
chooses its own docket and, in the recent past, has elected to shrink its caseload
to roughly seventy-five cases a year.”); Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon,
Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
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the Court serving in the role of a museum curator maintaining historical
relics from bygone eras, doing minor restoration work as needed, limiting access to these relics through statutory interpretation, and occasionally offering an exhibition involving issues at the periphery of securities law. 9 This approach deviates substantially from a judicial body
deeply invested in securities law.
A small number of excellent articles have already been authored
regarding the Roberts Court and securities regulation. 10 This Article
adds to the existing scholarship in three main ways. First, this Article
supplements the previous analyses of the Roberts Court because more
opinions now exist to be analyzed. 11 Currently, the Roberts Court has
authored twenty-one opinions in securities regulation cases, and it granted certiorari in two other cases that were dismissed prior to a decision
by the Court. 12 As a result, a new examination is possible and warranted. Second, since the last article on this topic, the Court has handed
down Salman v. United States, 13 which represents the Court’s first
major examination of insider trading regulation in two decades, 14 and
the Court’s first major examination of tipper-tippee liability in more
than three decades. 15 This Article places that opinion in context with

1219, 1225 (2012) (“Today’s Supreme Court decides markedly fewer cases than
its predecessors. Since the 2005 Term, the Court has decided an average of
80 cases per Term, far fewer than the roughly 200 cases it heard earlier in
the twentieth century.”).
9.

See infra Part II (explaining the Roberts Court’s approach to securities law).

10.

See John C. Coates IV, Securities Litigation in the Roberts Court: An Early
Assessment, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (2015); Eric Alan Isaacson, The Roberts
Court and Securities Class Actions: Reaffirming Basic Principles, 48 Akron
L. Rev. 923 (2015); Pritchard, supra note 7.

11.

The available scholarship on securities regulation and the Roberts Court
focuses on a smaller number of cases because of the cases existing at the time
that the articles were written or the aspect of securities law being examined.
See Coates, supra note 10, at 5 (examining fifteen cases from the Roberts
Court on securities regulation); Isaacson, supra note 10, at 925 (focusing on
Halliburton I, Amgen, and Halliburton II for purposes of examining securities
class actions in the Roberts Court); Pritchard, supra note 7, at 107 (analyzing
twelve cases from the Roberts Court on securities regulation).

12.

See infra Part I (surveying the existing case law from the Roberts Court
regarding securities regulation).

13.

137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).

14.

See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (providing the Supreme
Court’s last major opinion relating to insider trading regulation prior to
Salman).

15.

See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (providing the Supreme Court’s last
major opinion relating to tipper-tippee liability for insider trading prior to
Salman).
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the rest of the Roberts Court’s securities law opinions. Third, this Article provides new analysis of the Roberts Court’s approach to securities
regulation, including offering a new analogy for understanding the
Court’s approach to securities regulation, i.e., as a museum curator. It
also examines the death of the lower court laboratories approach in
creating and developing securities law and discusses the impact of the
Court’s current methodology of unflinchingly entrenching existing Supreme Court precedent. 16 Beyond that, this Article also puts to rest any
claims that the Roberts Court is pro-business in regard to securities
law. 17
Obviously, this Article can offer only part of the story. At the time
of the writing of this Article, Chief Justice John Roberts was sixty-two
years old. 18 This means that Chief Justice Roberts tenure is likely to be
at least twice the time he has already been on the Court. During that
time, because of the ages of the other Justices, a number of Justices are
likely to depart and join the Court. This means that the Roberts
Court’s approach to securities regulation could shift dramatically, especially if a Justice with a background and interest in securities regulation
similar to William O. Douglas or Lewis F. Powell is appointed. 19 Chief
Justice Roberts, however, has been sitting on the Court for over a decade, and at least some of the story of the Roberts Court and securities
regulation can be written.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part I provides a survey of existing securities regulation case law from the Roberts
Court, including the Court’s issuing of unrealized landmark opinions,
tinkering with core substantive issues of securities regulation, addressing issues relating to securities litigation procedure, and dealing with
16.

See infra Part II (discussing the Roberts Court as acting like a museum curator
and examining the implications of that approach upon securities law).

17.

See infra Part II.C (discussing why the Roberts Court should not be viewed
as a pro-business Court in regard to securities regulation).

18.

Biographies of Current Justices, supra note 2.

19.

See Kelly S. Kibbie, The Currently Mandated Myopia of Rule 10b-5: Pay No
Attention to that Manager Behind the Mutual Fund Curtain, 78 Mo. L.
Rev. 171, 181 n.58 (2013) (“Justice William O. Douglas, former chairman of
the SEC, and Justice Powell, a practitioner before his time on the Court,
were the only two securities lawyers to serve on the Court since the enactment
of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act.”); Pritchard, supra note 7, at 106 (“For
most of the first 50 years after the federal securities laws were adopted, the
Court had at least one Justice with a background in the securities laws,
either as a regulator—William O. Douglas—or as a practitioner—Lewis F.
Powell, Jr.”); A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 Duke L.J. 841, 847 (2003)
(“Apart from William O. Douglas, who served as chairman of the SEC before
his nomination to the Supreme Court, Lewis Powell is the only securities
lawyer to serve on the Court since the federal securities laws were passed in
1933 and 1934. Although other Justices had private practice experience, none
could match Powell’s hands-on experience with the federal securities laws.”).
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issues at the outer limits of securities regulation. Based upon this survey, Part II offers a description of the Roberts Court as a museum
curator in the area of securities regulation by preserving Supreme Court
precedent, doing minor restoration work when necessary, controlling
issues of access, and having the occasional special exhibit with issues at
the outer limits of securities regulation. This Part will also explore the
implications of this analogy, including the death of the lower court
laboratories approach in creating and developing securities law, the impact of the Court’s current methodology of entrenching existing Supreme Court precedent, and the fact that the Roberts Court should not
be referred to as a pro-business court in the area of securities regulation,
which is a foundational aspect of business law. Finally, the Conclusion
will discuss the future of the Roberts Court and offer brief concluding
remarks.

I. Survey of the Existing Case Law
The question of how to slice and dice the existing opinions from the
Roberts Court regarding securities regulation into categories is a difficult one. First, a decision must be made whether to include Dabit, in
which certiorari was granted prior to Chief Justice Roberts taking his
seat on the Court, because although members of the Roberts Court
authored the opinion, members of the Rehnquist Court were the ones
who thought the issues involved in that case was worth hearing in the
first place. 20 Second, a decision must be made whether to include two
cases in which certiorari was granted that were dismissed prior to a
decision by the Roberts Court, i.e., IndyMac 21 and UBS. 22 In IndyMac,
the Court dismissed the case because a settlement was reached prior to
oral arguments, 23 and in UBS, the Court dismissed an appeal pursuant
to agreement between the parties under Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the
Supreme Court. 24
In both instances, the cases have been included in the pool of cases
for analysis for this Article. In regard to the case in which certiorari
was granted prior to Chief Justice Roberts taking his seat on the Court,
although the granting of certiorari occurred by the Rehnquist Court,
20.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 545 U.S. 1164 (2005)
(order granting certiorari).

21.

Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014).

22.

UBS Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R. v. Union de Empleados de Muelles de P.R.
PRSSA Welfare Plan, 134 S. Ct. 40 (2013).

23.

Lyle Denniston, Securities Case Dropped; Split on Legal Issue Remains,
SCOTUSblog (Sept. 29, 2014, 1:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/
2014/09/securities-case-dropped-split-on-legal-issue-remains/ [https://
perma.cc/2BPN-AWS6].

24.

UBS, 134 S. Ct. at 40.

852

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017
The Supreme Court as Museum Curator

the opinion is the product of the Roberts Court and reflects the jurisprudence of that Court. In regard to the cases that were dismissed prior
to a decision by the Roberts Court, those cases are included in the pool
for analysis as well because despite the lack of an opinion in those cases,
they evidence the types of issues that are important enough for the
Court to grant certiorari, which is becoming an even rarer occurrence.25
The next question is how to divide the pool for purposes of analysis.
Numerous ways exist to do this. For example, one could divide the cases
into narrow discrete issues to provide a nuanced overview of the securities regulation issues that the Roberts Court has addressed; one could
divide the opinions between procedural and substantive issues to understand how the Court deals with such categories of issues; or one could
pick a discrete issue, such as securities litigation, to focus the scope of
analysis to a limited topic. Notably, all of these articles have already
been written. 26 Of course, at some point, each of these articles will almost certainly need to be updated, especially if the Supreme Court
continues at its current pace of deciding approximately two new securities law opinions per term. 27 However, that updating is left for another
day.
This Article takes a different approach than previous scholarship
by grouping the opinions of the Roberts Court into four broad categories: (1) Unrealized Landmark Opinions, (2) Tinkering with Core
Substantive Issues of Securities Law, (3) Securities Litigation Procedure, and (4) The Outer Limits of Securities Regulation. Obviously,
these categories are not neat and discrete. For example, Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd., 28 which involved the extraterritorial
application of federal securities regulation, could be considered both an
unrealized landmark opinion and a case focusing on securities litigation
procedure. 29 Also, in regard to Supreme Court case law, one person’s
triviality can be another person’s treasure, which means that some of

25.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the declining number
of cases in which the Supreme Court is willing to grant certiorari).

26.

See Pritchard, supra note 7 (providing a nuanced overview of securities law
in the Roberts Court by discussing the various issues that the Roberts Court
has addressed); Coates, supra note 10 (dividing securities regulation opinions
of the Roberts Court into substantive and procedural opinions for purposes
of engaging in qualitative and quantitative analysis); Isaacson, supra note 10
(analyzing securities regulation in the Roberts Court for purposes of
understanding securities class action litigation).

27.

See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing that the current pace
of the Roberts Court in deciding cases regarding securities regulation is two
per term).

28.

561 U.S. 247 (2010).

29.

Id.
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the cases that are characterized as tinkering with core issues of securities regulation in the pages of this Article might be characterized as an
unrealized landmark opinion or even a realized landmark opinion by
another commentator. The grouping of cases within this Article, however, does not need to be perfect. The purpose of this Article is to get
a general sense of how the Roberts Court is approaching securities regulation for purposes of determining general themes and understanding
the consequences of those themes. Unlike if this piece focused on quantitative analysis, loose groupings are enough for purposes of the qualitative analysis of this piece. 30
As these groupings show, and as will be developed in the next Part,
the Roberts Court is playing the role of museum curator in regard to
securities regulation by preserving the artifacts created by Supreme
Court precedent. It at times does minor restoration work to these artifacts, and it helps to arrange access to them. However, the days of an
activist Court in the area of securities regulation have long past. As a
means of exploring this approach by the Roberts Court, each of the
four broad categories of opinions will be examined in turn.
A. Unrealized Landmark Opinions

As previously mentioned, the Roberts Court has authored twentyone opinions in securities regulation cases, 31 and it granted certiorari in
two other cases that were dismissed prior to a decision by the Court. 32
All of this suggests a deep and abiding love for securities regulation,
especially considering that the Rehnquist Court heard roughly half the
number of securities law cases per term during its existence, 33 and the
number of cases granted certiorari is much smaller than it used to be.34
The cases themselves, however, tell a very different story. The vast
30.

The discussion in this Article will focus on a qualitative analysis of the existing
opinions, rather than quantitative analysis. This approach is taken for three
main reasons. First, qualitative analysis better tells the story of securities
regulation in the Roberts Court. The granting of certiorari by the Roberts
Court grossly distorts the Court’s interest in shaping securities regulation,
which appears to be minimal. Second, even if all twenty-one opinions are
included in the analysis, this is a relatively small sample size for meaningful
quantitative analysis. Third, the confounding variables based upon the wide
array of issues contained within these opinions makes statistical analysis difficult. As a result, a qualitative analysis to tell the story of the Roberts Court
and securities regulation is superior.

31.

See supra note 3 and accompanying text (identifying securities law cases
decided by the Roberts Court).

32.

See supra note 6 and accompanying text (referencing IndyMac and UBS).

33.

See supra note 7 and accompanying text (providing a comparison of the
securities regulation caseloads of the Rehnquist Court and the Roberts Court).

34.

See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing the decreasing number
of cases granted certiorari and decided by the Supreme Court).
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majority of the cases that the Roberts Court has heard represent minor
tinkering with key issues of securities regulation, 35 procedural issues
that might more easily be taught as part of a course in civil procedure, 36
and issues on the outer limits of securities regulation. 37 The bulk of the
cases would at best be included within notes in securities law textbooks
and treatises, rather than receiving lengthy, in-depth treatment.
The cases that had the potential to be landmark opinions are few
and far between. Of the twenty-one opinions of the Roberts Court and
the two cases granted certiorari that were dismissed prior to judgment,
the number that could have substantially altered the landscape of securities regulation can perhaps be counted on one hand. Stoneridge, Morrison, Halliburton II, and Salman each offered the Roberts Court the
opportunity to leave a lasting mark on the field of securities regulation,
and in each instance the Court opted to be guided almost solely by
existing Supreme Court precedent. 38
In Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, 39 the
Court had and declined the opportunity to expand liability based upon
the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to a
broader class of individuals and entities. 40 The Court refused to adopt
a theory known as “scheme liability” under the private right of action
that was substantially similar to aiding and abetting liability, which
the Court had previously rejected. 41 In that case, Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC (Stoneridge) brought a class action suit against Charter
Communications, Inc. (Charter), Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. (Scientific-Atlanta), and Motorola, Inc. (Motorola). 42 Stoneridge alleged that Charter

35.

See infra Part I.B (examining various cases that can be characterized as the
Roberts Court tinkering with core substantive issues of securities regulation).

36.

See infra Part I.C (analyzing cases that can be characterized as the Roberts
Court addressing procedural issues relating to securities litigation).

37.

See infra Part I.D (discussing various cases that can be characterized as the
Roberts Court addressing issues on the outer limits of securities regulation).

38.

See Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016); Halliburton Co. v. Erica
P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014); Morrison v. Nat’l
Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008).

39.

552 U.S. 148 (2008).

40.

Id. at 165 (“The decision to extend the cause of action is for Congress, not
for us. Though it remains the law, the § 10(b) private right should not be
extended beyond its present boundaries.”).

41.

Id. at 159–60; see also id. at 155–56 (referring to the Court’s decision in
Central Bank not to extend § 10(b) liability to aiders and abettors).

42.

Id. at 153.
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had issued various fraudulent statements to meet Wall Street expectations about its financial outlook. 43 Stoneridge alleged that in an attempt
to disguise these fraudulent statements, Charter engaged in various
sham transactions with Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola. 44 The United
State District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted
Scientific-Atlanta’s and Motorola’s motions to dismiss, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. 45 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari because “[d]ecisions of the Courts of Appeals
[were] in conflict respecting when, if ever, an injured investor may rely
upon § 10(b) to recover from a party that neither makes a public misstatement nor violates a duty to disclose but does participate in a
scheme to violate § 10(b).” 46
The Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the District Court and
the Circuit Court and held that Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola could
not be held liable under the private right of action. 47 Speaking for the
majority that included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Scalia,
and Thomas, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, “[t]he § 10(b) implied
private right of action does not extend to aiders and abettors. The
conduct of a secondary actor must satisfy each of the elements or preconditions for liability . . . .” 48 In reaching this holding, the Court relied
heavily on precedent from the Rehnquist Court. 49 In Central Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 50 a case handed down in
1994, the Court held that no aiding and abetting liability existed under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 51 The Court also noted that while Congress had elected to give the government the ability to pursue aiders
and abettors under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 52 that Congress had never extended liability to aiders and abettors
under the private right of action. 53 Justice Kennedy also wrote, “[t]he
determination of who can seek a remedy has significant consequences
43.

Id.

44.

Id. at 153–54.

45.

Id. at 155.

46.

Id. at 156.

47.

Id. at 158.

48.

Id.

49.

Id. at 157–58.

50.

511 U.S. 164 (1994).

51.

Id. at 191 (“Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting,
we hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit
under § 10(b).”).

52.

Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).

53.

Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 158.
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for the reach of federal power. . . . Concerns with the judicial creation
of a private cause of action caution against its expansion. The decision
to extend the cause of action is for Congress, not for us.” 54
Justice John Paul Stevens authored a dissent that was joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Souter. 55 Justice Stevens expressed concern about interpreting Central Bank broadly. 56 As he wrote, “while I recognize that the Central Bank opinion provides a precedent for judicial
policymaking decisions in this area of the law, I respectfully dissent
from the Court’s continuing campaign to render the private cause of
action under § 10(b) toothless.” 57
Morrison offered the Court its next opportunity to remake previous
Supreme Court precedent, and although the Court discarded a welldeveloped body of lower court law, it once again refused to extend or
contract the scope of the private right of action under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 beyond the boundaries that had previously been set by the
Court. 58 In that case, National Australia Bank Limited (National), a
foreign bank, acquired HomeSide Lending, Inc. (HomeSide), a mortgage
servicing company headquartered in Florida. 59 As alleged in the case,
despite National’s annual reports, other public documents, and other
public statements from 1998 to mid-2001 asserting that Homeside was
operating successfully, National wrote down the value of HomeSide’s
assets by $450 million on July 5, 2001, and National wrote down the
value of HomeSide’s assets by another $1.75 billion on September 3,
2001. 60 During the period of the alleged misstatements, National’s
ordinary shares, which are the same as common stock in the United
States, were not sold on any exchange in the United States. 61 Russell
Leslie Owen, Brian Silverlock, and Geraldine Silverlock (the Plaintiffs),
who are all Australians, attempted to represent a class of foreign purchasers of National’s ordinary shares during a period prior to National’s
write-down of HomeSide’s assets in September of 2001. 62 The Plaintiffs
brought their case in the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York alleging violations of sections 10(b) and 20(a) of

54.

Id. at 165.

55.

Id. at 167 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

56.

Id. at 175.

57.

Id.

58.

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 272–73 (2010).

59.

Id. at 251.

60.

Id. at 251–52.

61.

Id. at 251.

62.

Id. at 252–53.
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. 63 The District
Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss based upon Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.64
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the
District Court’s opinion. 65 In affirming the dismissal, the Circuit Court
held, “[t]he issue for us to resolve here boils down to what conduct
comprises the heart of the alleged fraud.” 66 It concluded, “[t]he actions
taken and the actions not taken by [National] in Australia were, in our
view, significantly more central to the fraud and more directly responsible for the harm to investors than the manipulation of the numbers
in Florida.” 67
The Supreme Court affirmed the District Court and the Circuit
Court. 68 The Court began its opinion by holding that the case should
have been dismissed based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, rather than based upon Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
because the District Court was being asked to determine what conduct
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 prohibit, which is a question focused on
the merits, rather than a subject matter jurisdiction question that is
based on the power of a court to hear a case. 69 The Court, however,
declined to remand the case because nothing in the lower courts’ analyses turned on the error, and remand would have led to the same result.70
The Court then held that section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not apply
extraterritorially. 71 In reaching this holding, the Court relied on Supreme Court precedent regarding a general presumption against Congressional intent to provide extraterritorial application of United States
law. 72 Writing for the majority, which included Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Thomas, Justice Antonin Scalia
wrote, “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial

63.

Id.

64.

In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465,
at *8 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 25, 2006), aff’d, 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 561
U.S. 247 (2010).

65.

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 177 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d,
561 U.S. 247 (2010).

66.

Id. at 175.

67.

Id. at 176.

68.

Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 273 (2010).

69.

Id. at 254.

70.

Id.

71.

Id. at 255–61.

72.

Id. at 255.
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application, it has none.” 73 He continued that litigation over the exterritorial application of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, which began in the
Second Circuit approximately four decades ago, has been substantial
and “has produced a collection of tests for divining what Congress
would have wanted, complex in formulation and unpredictable in application.” 74 The Court viewed this as “judicial-speculation-made-law.”75
Based upon concerns about these departures from the presumption
against extraterritoriality and the related unpredictability that has ensued, the Court held, “[r]ather than guess anew in each case, we apply
the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background against
which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.” 76 The Court also
held, “it is in our view only transactions in securities listed on domestic
exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to which
§ 10(b) applies.” 77 As a consequence, this transactional test replaced
the conduct and effects test that had been previously used to determine
the limits of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, and four decades of lower
court precedent regarding the extraterritorial application of those
provisions was overruled. 78
Two concurring opinions were also authored in the case. Justice
Stephen Breyer wrote an opinion concurring with the majority, but he
argued that its opinion should have been more focused on the specific
facts of the case. 79 Justice John Paul Stevens also wrote a concurring
opinion that Justice Ginsburg joined in which he took significant issue
with the majority’s reasoning. 80 He argued that in regard to the extraterritorial application of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 “[t]he Second
Circuit’s test became the ‘north star’ of § 10(b) jurisprudence . . . [in
this area], not just regionally but nationally as well.” 81 Justice Stevens
claimed that Congress welcomed “judicial elaboration” in the area of
the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 82 He also
argued that the majority misapplied the presumption against extraterritoriality. 83 As a result, he concluded, “[t]he Court instead elects to
73.

Id.

74.

Id. at 255–56.

75.

Id. at 261.

76.

Id.

77.

Id. at 267.

78.

Id.

79.

Id. at 273−74 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

80.

Id. at 274–86 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).

81.

Id. at 275.

82.

Id. at 276.

83.

Id. at 278–85.
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upend a significant area of securities law based on a plausible, but hardly decisive, construction of the statutory text.” 84
In Halliburton II, the Court again had the chance to reimagine securities regulation in the United States by potentially destroying the
fraud-on-the-market theory that creates a presumption of reliance that
allows for class certifications under the implied private right of action
based upon section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 85 Again, the Court with minor
clarification chose to reaffirm previous Supreme Court precedent and
neither limit nor expand federal securities regulation, despite the fact
that the Roberts Court could have significantly advanced business
interests by effectively destroying the existence of class actions under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 86
In Halliburton II, Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Fund) sought to be
lead plaintiff in a class action against Halliburton and one of its executives (collectively Halliburton) for alleged violations of section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. 87 Halliburton argued that the fraud-on-the-market
presumption had been rebutted in the case because it had presented
evidence that the alleged misrepresentations were not reflected in the
stock price, and that as a result, investors would have to prove reliance
on an individual basis. 88 The District Court rejected Halliburton’s
arguments and certified the class, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 89 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari for two reasons. First, the Court
“accepted Halliburton’s invitation to reconsider the presumption of reliance for securities fraud claims” brought as class actions that had been
established by previous Supreme Court precedent, i.e. the fraud-on-themarket theory. 90 Second, the Supreme Court wanted to resolve a
dispute among the Circuit Courts of Appeals over whether the
presumption of reliance can be rebutted at the class certification stage
based upon evidence of lack of price impact by the alleged
misrepresentation. 91
The Court refused to overrule the “fraud-on-the-market” theory
that had been established by the Rehnquist Court in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson. 92 In Basic, the Court held that reliance is a required element
84.

Id. at 286.

85.

Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2407 (2014).

86.

Id. at 2417.

87.

Id. at 2405–06.

88.

Id. at 2406.

89.

Id. at 2406–07.

90.

Id. at 2407.

91.

Id.

92.

Id. at 2407–13 (discussing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988)).
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of the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b5, 93 and that reliance can be presumed in instances in which a plaintiff
purchased or sold securities in a well-developed, impersonal market.94
This presumption allows for the certification of class actions under the
implied private right of action because otherwise reliance would have
to be proven on an individual basis. 95 This fraud-on-the-market theory
is founded upon the notion that the price of securities in an efficient
market reflects all material, public information. 96 Justice Blackmun,
writing for the Court in Basic, stated, “[a]ny showing that severs the
link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received
(or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price,
will be sufficient to rebut the presumption of reliance.” 97
In Halliburton II, Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the majority
opinion of the Court, which was joined by Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. 98 The Court refused to overrule Basic
because the Court held that it will only overrule “long-settled precedent” based upon “special justification,” rather than just a claim that
the precedent was erroneously established. 99 The Court rejected an
argument that the implied private right of action is defined inconsistently with the express cause of action under section 18(a) of the
Exchange Act because such an argument was made by the dissenting
Justices in Basic. 100 The Court also rejected concerns that the “efficient
capital markets hypothesis” on which the fraud-on-the-market theory
is founded has been in part discredited, 101 and it also rejected concerns
that investors might not invest based on the integrity of the market
price. 102 The Court dismissed these concerns based in large part upon
the presumption of reliance being rebuttable, which suggests that the
Court in Basic already considered these issues. 103 In regard to applying
stare decisis, Chief Justice Roberts wrote it has “special force” because
“Congress may overturn or modify any aspect of our interpretations of
93.

Basic, 485 U.S. at 243.

94.

Id. at 241–45.

95.

Id.

96.

Id. at 241–42.

97.

Id. at 248.

98.

Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2404−05 (2014).

99.

Id. at 2407.

100. Id. at 2408–09.
101. Id. at 2409–10.
102. Id. at 2410–11.
103. Id. at 2408–11.
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the reliance requirement, including the Basic presumption itself.” 104 The
Court viewed the presumption as maintaining the original scope of the
implied private right of action. 105 The Court also rejected concerns
about the presumption of reliance being used as a means to “allow
plaintiffs to extort large settlements from defendants for meritless
claims; punish innocent shareholders, who end up having to pay settlements and judgments; impose excessive costs on businesses; and consume a disproportionately large share of judicial resources.” 106 The
Court did so because it believed that Congress has addressed these
issues to some extent in other ways, such as by passing the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 107 and the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998. 108
The Court also clarified the Basic presumption by holding that
defendants are allowed to introduce evidence at the class certification
stage rebutting the presumption by demonstrating that the alleged misrepresentation did not impact the price of the security. 109 The Court
reached this holding because Basic provides for wide latitude to defeat
the presumption of reliance and because allowing the presumption to
be challenged at the class certification stage makes sense because the
presumption is inherently related to the certification of the class. 110
Two concurring opinions were also authored in the case. Justice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote one of the concurrences, which was joined
by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor. 111 The concurrence is a single paragraph that is designed to convey her belief that “[t]he Court’s judgment
. . . should impose no heavy toll on securities-fraud plaintiffs with tenable claims.” 112 Justice Thomas authored the other concurrence, which
Justices Alito and Scalia joined. 113 Justice Thomas unabashedly argues
that Basic should be overruled and that the “fraud-on-the-market”
theory should be discarded. 114 Justice Thomas did not believe that stare
104. Id. at 2411.
105. Id. at 2412.
106. Id. at 2413.
107. Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
108. Id.; Pub. L. No. 105–353, 112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
109. Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2414−17.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2417 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 2417 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
114. Id. at 2417–18.
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decisis requires the Court to preserve the presumption created in
Basic. 115 He reached this conclusion because the Court is dealing with
an implied private right of action, rather than express statutory language. 116 He wrote: “[W]hen we err in areas of judge-made law, we ought
to presume that Congress expects us to correct our own mistakes—not
the other way around.” 117 As a result, Justice Thomas concluded,
“Basic’s presumption of reliance remains our mistake to correct.” 118
Finally, Salman v. United States 119 offered the Roberts Court an
opportunity to remake federal securities regulation in the area of insider
trading, and once again the Court chose to preserve the status quo
created by existing precedent. 120 In that case, Bassam Salman (Salman)
was convicted of insider trading based upon receiving material, nonpublic information as a gift from his friend and brother-in-law, Mounir
Kara. 121 Mounir Kara had received the information from his own
brother, Maher Kara. 122 Maher Kara had possession of the information
because he was an investment banker in Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking group. 123 Evidence was presented at trial that Salman
knew the source of the information. 124 Salman was indicted on one count
of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and four counts of insider
trading under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 125 The United States District Court for the Northern District of California convicted Salman on
all counts. 126 Citing a recent opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, United States v. Newman, 127 which required
a “close personal relationship” to convict a tippee for making a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or a friend, Salman sought
review of his conviction from the United States Court of Appeals for

115. Id. at 2425.
116. Id. at 2425–26.
117. Id. at 2426.
118. Id.
119. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
120. Id. at 426–29.
121. Id. at 423–24.
122. Id. at 424.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 425.
125. Id. at 424.
126. Id. at 425.
127. 773. F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242 (2015).
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the Ninth Circuit. 128 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the Second Circuit’s grafting on of a “close personal relationship” requirement for tippee liability and affirmed Salman’s conviction. 129
The Supreme Court affirmed the opinions of the District Court and
the Ninth Circuit and upheld Salman’s conviction. 130 Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Samuel Alito stated, “[i]n Dirks v. SEC . . .,
this Court explained that a tippee’s liability for trading on inside information hinges on whether the tipper breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing the information. A tipper breaches such a fiduciary duty, we
held, when the tipper discloses the inside information for a personal
benefit.” 131 In Dirks, the Court held that an inference of such a personal
benefit exists “when an insider makes a gift of confidential information
to a trading relative or friend.” 132 Salman urged that the Court to adopt
a test that requires monetary benefit to the tipper because otherwise,
liability would often turn on the closeness of relationship, which could
render the boundaries of insider trading indeterminate with liability for
remote tippees. 133 Justice Alito was unequivocal that Dirks already resolved the issue before the Court. 134 He wrote, “[o]ur discussion of gift
giving [in Dirks] resolves this case,” 135 and “Salman’s conduct is in the
heartland of Dirks’s rule concerning gifts.” 136 As a result, Salman’s
conviction was affirmed. 137
B. Tinkering with Core Substantive Issues of Securities Law

In addition to the unrealized landmark cases discussed above, the
Roberts Court has also granted certiorari and issued decisions in a number of other cases dealing with core substantive issues of federal securities regulation. Jones, Matrixx, Halliburton I, Janus, Amgen, and Omnicare could all be included in this group. 138 While none of these cases

128. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 425 (quoting Newman, 773 F.3d at 452).
129. Id. at 425.
130. Id. at 429.
131. Id. at 423 (citation omitted).
132. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983).
133. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 426.
134. Id. at 427.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 429.
137. Id.
138. See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund,
135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133
S. Ct. 1184 (2013); Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,
564 U.S. 135 (2011); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co.
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presented as large of an opportunity for the Roberts Court to have an
impact on federal securities regulation as the cases discussed in the last
Section, each of these opinions represented the Court interpreting important aspects of federal securities law, and the fact that the Court
viewed the issues contained within them significant enough to grant
certiorari is important in itself because of how rarely the Court currently grants certiorari.
The cases themselves entailed a myriad of different issues. In Jones
v. Harris Associates L.P., 139 for example, the Court examined a claim
that an investment advisor had violated section 36(b) of the Investment
Company Act of 1940 by breaching its fiduciary duties by charging fees
that were too high to manage investors’ mutual funds. 140 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice Alito stated, “to face liability under § 36(b),
an investment adviser must charge a fee that is so disproportionately
large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered
and could not have been the product of arm’s length bargaining.”141
Notably, the Supreme Court relied extensively on a Second Circuit
opinion in Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc. 142 in
formulating its holding. 143 Although joining the majority opinion, Justice Thomas authored a concurring opinion to suggest that the Court
(Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804 (2011); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,
563 U.S. 27 (2011); Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335 (2010).
139. 559 U.S. 335 (2010).
140. Id. at 338. One could argue whether this case should be discussed in this
Section. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
are traditionally viewed as the most important sources of federal securities
law. See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the
United States, and the European Union, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 475, 512 (2011)
(“To be sure, the most significant pieces of investor protection legislation in
the United States, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 . . . .”); James D. Gordon III, Defining a Common Enterprise
in Investment Contracts, 72 Ohio St. L.J. 59, 63 (2011) (“[A]fter the stock
market crash of 1929, Congress passed comprehensive legislation regulating
securities. The two most important acts are the Securities Act of 1933 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.”); Carol B. Swanson, Corporate Governance: Sliding Seamlessly into the Twenty-First Century, 21 J. Corp. L.
417, 441 (1996) (“Securities market regulations flowed from the 1929 stock
market crash and the subsequent collapse of economic activity . . . . The two
most significant laws were the Securities Act of 1933, which regulated new
public offerings, and the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 . . . .”). As a
result, because this case involved a provision of the Investment Company
Act of 1940, this case is included here.
141. Jones, 559 U.S. at 346.
142. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
143. Jones, 559 U.S. at 343–46.
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should not be viewed as adopting the “Gartenberg standard” because
of the breadth of the scope of that standard. 144
The Court in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano 145 addressed
the standards for materiality and scienter under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. 146 Relying on the standard for materiality announced in Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 147 the Court held that statistical significance of information that has failed to be disclosed is not a prerequisite to establishing the materiality, 148 and similarly, relying on the standard announced
in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. 149 for scienter, the Court
held that statistical significance of the information that has failed to be
disclosed is also not a prerequisite to establishing scienter. 150 Notably,
this case involved a unanimous Court with an opinion written by Justice Sonia Sotomayor allowing a class action to be maintained against
a corporation by maintaining the existing boundaries of Supreme Court
precedent. 151
In Halliburton I, the Court addressed whether loss causation must
be proven for purposes of obtaining class certification under the implied
private right of action based upon section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 152 Relying on the discussion of class certification in Basic Inc. v. Levinson,153
the unanimous Court in an opinion authored by Chief Justice John
Roberts held that proof of loss causation is not a prerequisite for
obtaining class certification, or even use of the fraud-on-the-market
theory, under the implied private right of action. 154 Once again, the
Roberts Court allowed an action against a corporate defendant to proceed by maintaining the existing boundaries of Supreme Court precedent. 155
Of course, not all of the securities regulation issues addressed by
the Roberts Court have fit neatly within existing Supreme Court case
law, and unsurprisingly, in these cases, unanimous opinions are far less
144. Id. at 353–55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
145. 563 U.S. 27 (2011).
146. Id. at 30–31.
147. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
148. Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 43–44.
149. 551 U.S. 308, 313–14 (2007).
150. Matrixx, 563 U.S. at 48–50.
151. Id. at 29–31.
152. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton, (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804, 807
(2011).
153. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
154. Halliburton I, 563 U.S. at 811–13.
155. Id. at 815.
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common. In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,156
for instance, the Court explored the question of what it means to
“make” material misrepresentations for purposes of rendering behavior
unlawful under section 10(b). 157 Writing for a majority that included
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kennedy, and Scalia, Justice
Clarence Thomas began the analysis of the Court by stating that when
faced with a new issue, the implied right of action under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 should be interpreted narrowly because of the lack of
Congressional authorization and guidance for its existence and
expansion. 158 As a result, relying heavily on the limits set by such cases
as Central Bank and Stoneridge, the Court held, “[f]or purposes of Rule
10b–5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate
authority over the statement, including its content and whether and
how to communicate it.” 159 Justice Stephen Breyer authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, and Sotomayor in which he argued for a broader definition of when an individual
“makes” a misrepresentation for purposes of liability. 160
In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds,161
the Roberts Court was divided over the issue of whether proof of materiality is required for class certification to maintain a class action based
upon the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.162
In an opinion authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg that was joined
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor, the Court held that it is not. 163 As a result, opinions from the
Second Circuit and Third Circuit with contrary holdings were abrogated, and a class action against a corporation was allowed to proceed. 164 Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas both filed dissenting opinions
that argued for requiring proof of materiality prior to class certification. 165 Notably, both dissents focused on interpreting the guidance that
the Court had previously provided in Basic v. Levinson regarding how
class certification is supposed to be granted in matters involving the

156. 564 U.S. 135 (2011).
157. Id. at 137–38.
158. Id. at 141–42.
159. Id. at 143.
160. Id. at 149–50 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
161. 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
162. Id. at 1191.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1191, 1194.
165. Id. at 1205 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1206 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 166 In addition, Justice Alito filed a concurrence that the reason why he signed
onto the majority opinion was because he did not view the issue in the
case as entailing the fraud-on-the-market presumption that was announced in Basic. 167
Finally, in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund, 168 the Roberts Court addressed the
materiality of opinion statements in the context of a class action under
section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. 169 That case involved a
circumstance in which an issuer had offered an opinion in a registration
statement that might have suggested facts to investors that were in
conflict with facts that were known, but not included in the registration
statement, by the issuer. 170 Writing for a majority that included Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and
Sotomayor, Justice Elana Kagan stated: “[I]f a registration statement
omits material facts about the issuer’s inquiry into or knowledge concerning a statement of opinion, and if those facts conflict with what a
reasonable investor would take from the statement itself, then § 11’s
omissions clause creates liability.” 171 As a result, the Court remanded
the matter to apply this new standard, and as a consequence, the class
action against the corporation was potentially allowed to proceed.172
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas each offered concurring opinions that
agreed with the judgment of the Court, but that would have applied
more refined standards for determining the materiality of opinions. 173
C. Securities Litigation Procedure

As previously mentioned, the grouping of cases within this Article
is not perfect because one of the unrealized landmark cases and some
of the cases involving core issues of securities regulation have procedural
aspects to them. For example, Morrison involved the extraterritorial
application of the federal securities regulation, which could be characterized as a jurisdictional issue, although one might take issue with this

166. Id. at 1204–06 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1206–16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1204 (Alito, J., concurring).
168. 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015).
169. Id. at 1323.
170. Id. at 1323–24.
171. Id. at 1329.
172. Id. at 1332–33.
173. Id. at 1334–37 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 1337–38 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
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characterization. 174 In addition, many of the opinions already discussed,
e.g., Halliburton I, Halliburton II, and Amgen, relate to questions of
class certification, which is a procedural matter. 175 This evidences, however, how invested the Roberts Courts is regarding settling procedural
questions, especially in the area of securities regulation. The Roberts
Court has decided numerous cases squarely focusing on procedural
issues, including Dabit, Kircher, Billing, Tellabs, Merck, Simmonds,
Gabelli, Chadbourne, and Manning. 176 In addition, the Roberts Court
also granted certiorari on two cases, IndyMac and UBS, that were dismissed prior to the Court issuing an opinion, and both of these cases
focused on procedural issues as well. 177
A number of the cases that the Roberts Court has decided regarding
securities litigation procedure involve the Securities Litigation Uniform
Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), which had been relatively recently
enacted at the time when Chief Justice Roberts took his seat on the

174. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253–54 (2010). Notably, in
Morrison, the District Court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss
based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. In re Nat’l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537
(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at *4, *9 (S.D.N.Y Oct. 25, 2006), aff’d sub nom,
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d, 561
U.S. 247 (2010). The Supreme Court held, however, that the case should
have been dismissed based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim, rather than based upon Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because the District
Court was being asked to determine what conduct section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 prohibit, which is a question based on the merits, rather than a subject
matter jurisdiction question that focuses on the power of a court to hear a
case. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 253–54. Regardless, however, the case had strong
procedural overtones.
175. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct.
2398 (2014); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184
(2013); Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S.
804 (2011).
176. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562
(2016); Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014); Gabelli
v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds,
132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633 (2010);
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007); Credit
Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Kircher v. Putnam
Funds Tr., 547 U.S. 633 (2006); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc.
v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71 (2006).
177. See Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. of Miss. v. IndyMac MBS, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 42
(2014) (dismissing the Writ of Certiorari “as improvidently granted”); UBS
Fin. Servs. Inc. of P.R. v. Union de Empleados de Muelles de P.R. PRSSA
Welfare Plan, 134 S. Ct. 40 (2013) (dismissing the Writ of Certiorari pursuant
to Rule 46.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court).
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Court. 178 In Dabit, for instance, the Court vacated an opinion from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit written by then
circuit judge, Sonia Sotomayor, on the ground that SLUSA’s preemptive power should be interpreted broadly. 179 At issue was whether
SLUSA’s federal preemption of class actions involving more than 50
people in connection with the purchase or sale of securities traded nationally and listed on a national exchange should apply to an action
brought by individuals who just held their securities. 180 Writing for a
unanimous Court, Justice John Paul Stevens stated: “For purposes of
SLUSA pre-emption, [the] distinction [between holders and purchasers
and sellers] is irrelevant; the identity of the plaintiffs does not determine
whether the complaint alleges fraud ‘in connection with the purchase
or sale’ of securities.” 181 As a result, the Court interpreted the preemptive scope of SLUSA broadly to include holders of securities bringing
state law claims in federal court as a class action, even though federal
securities law would not allow these holders to proceed to obtain relief. 182
In Kircher v. Putnam Funds Trust, 183 the Court again addressed a
procedural issue created by Congress’s enactment of SLUSA; this time
in the context of the appealability of orders remanding cases to state
court that had been held not to fall within SLUSA’s ambit. 184 In that
case, Justice David Souter wrote for a nearly unanimous Court in which
Justice Scalia disagreed with only one part of the majority opinion and
as a result authored a relatively brief concurring opinion. 185 Based largely on interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1447, which is not a provision viewed as
being part of federal securities law, the Court held that orders remanding cases to state court that were held not to fall within SLUSA’s
ambit are not appealable, which led to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit’s opinion to be vacated and the appeal
to that court being dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 186

178. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353,
112 Stat. 3227 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
179. Dabit, 547 U.S. at 74, 89, rev’g 395 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2005).
180. Id. at 82–84.
181. Id. at 89.
182. Id. at 88–89.
183. 547 U.S. 633 (2006).
184. Id. at 635–36.
185. Id. at 635; id. at 648–50 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
186. Id. at 648.
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The Roberts Court has also addressed numerous other procedural
issues beyond the scope of SLUSA. The Court in Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Billing 187 explored when federal securities law implicitly precludes the application of antitrust law. 188 In Billing, writing
for a majority that included Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito,
Ginsburg, Scalia, and Souter, Justice Stephen Breyer explained:
[I]n finding sufficient incompatibility to warrant an implication of
preclusion, [this Court’s decisions] have treated the following
factors as critical: (1) the existence of regulatory authority under
the securities law to supervise the activities in question; (2) evidence that the responsible regulatory entities exercise that authority; and (3) a resulting risk that the securities and antitrust
laws, if both applicable, would produce conflicting guidance, requirements, duties, privileges, or standards of conduct. 189

Based on application of this test, the Court held that federal securities
law implicitly precluded the application of antitrust law in a case involving a class action asserting that underwriting firms allegedly violated antitrust law by entering into illegal contracts with purchasers of
securities distributed in an initial public offering because federal securities law is “clearly incompatible” with antitrust law in addressing the
matter and securities law is designed to govern initial public offerings.190
As a result, the Court reversed an opinion of the Second Circuit, and
the antitrust claims were not allowed to proceed. 191 Justice Stevens
authored a concurring opinion that asserted that antitrust law did not
prohibit the alleged behavior of the underwriting firms. 192 In addition,
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion arguing that the Securities
Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 both explicitly preserve the right to relief under antitrust law. 193

187. 551 U.S. 264 (2007).
188. Id. at 267. While this case does involve a procedural issue, it is sufficiently
unique and discrete that it may merit separate treatment from the traditional issues thought of as securities procedure, which are discussed in this
Section, especially considering the case involved another substantial and welldeveloped area of the law, i.e., antitrust law. However, because the decision
is procedural in nature, the choice has been made to include it here.
189. Id. at 275–76.
190. Id. at 285.
191. Id. at 270.
192. Id. at 285–87 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
193. Id. at 287 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 194 the Court examined the pleading standard for scienter in actions under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 that was established in the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) in a case involving a securities fraud class
action. 195 Writing for a majority that included Chief Justice Roberts
and Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg stated that to meet the “strong inference” standard for scienter established by the PLRSA, “an inference of scienter must be more
than merely plausible or reasonable—it must be cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent.” 196 As a
result, the Court held: “A plaintiff alleging fraud in a § 10(b) action
. . . must plead facts rendering an inference of scienter at least as likely
as any plausible opposing inference . . . . [S]he must demonstrate that
it is more likely than not that the defendant acted with scienter.”197
Justice Scalia and Justice Alito each filed concurring opinions arguing
that the PSLRA established a stronger standard for pleading scienter.198
Justice Stevens also filed a dissenting opinion in which he argued that
the proper standard to use was something closer to probable cause. 199
The Roberts Court has also heard and issued opinions in a number
of cases involving issues related to federal securities regulation and statutes of limitation. In Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 200 for example,
the Court examined the statute of limitations for the private right of
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in the context of a securities
class action. 201 The Court granted certiorari to address a split among
the circuit courts regarding the issue. 202 In an opinion written by Justice
Stephen Breyer that was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Alito, Ginsburg, Kennedy, and Sotomayor, the Court held that the
statute of limitations begins to run under 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b) for a
private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 at the time
a plaintiff knows or a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have known of
the facts constituting the violation. 203 Through this holding, the Court
194. 551 U.S. 308 (2007).
195. Id. at 313–14.
196. Id. at 314.
197. Id. at 328–29.
198. Id. at 329 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 333–34 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
199. Id. at 335–37 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
200. 559 U.S. 633 (2010).
201. Id. at 637.
202. Id. at 643–44.
203. Id. at 653.
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ended up adopting the approach being used by the Sixth Circuit and
abrogating the approaches used by the Second Circuit and the Eleventh
Circuit. 204 The Court also held that discovery of the facts constituting
the violation for the private right of action under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 includes facts relating to scienter. 205 As a result, the Court
held that investors in a corporation were allowed to proceed with their
class action. 206 Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion and Justice
Scalia filed a concurring opinion that Justice Thomas joined explaining
their reasoning for supporting the outcome of the majority opinion.207
In Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 208 the Court
addressed the application of the statute of limitations to the disgorgement of short-swing profits under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. 209 In that case, as a result of Chief Justice Roberts taking
no part in the consideration or decision of the case, the Court was
equally divided four to four as to whether the statute of limitations in
section 16(b), which provides that actions for disgorgement must be
brought within “two years after the date such profit was realized,”210
could be tolled. 211 Regardless, the Court held that tolling would not
apply in the case because of the manner in which equitable tolling rules
are traditionally applied. 212 Justice Antonin Scalia wrote a unanimous
opinion for the Court regarding this holding, and the Court abrogated
holdings from the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit to the contrary. 213
The Court in Gabelli v. SEC 214 explored the role of a statute of
limitations in an SEC enforcement action under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 215 for civil penalties for aiding and abetting fraud.216 In
that case, the Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that the
204. See id. at 643–44 (differentiating the Sixth Circuit’s approach from the
approaches adopted by the Second and Eleventh Circuits).
205. Id. at 649, 653.
206. Id. at 654.
207. Id. at 655 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
id. at 655–61 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
208. 132 S. Ct. 1414 (2012).
209. Id. at 1417.
210. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2012).
211. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. at 1419–1421.
212. Id. at 1421.
213. Id.
214. 133 S. Ct. 1216 (2013).
215. Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 789, 847–57 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2012)).
216. Gabelli, 133 S. Ct. at 1218–19.
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statute of limitations, which was found in 28 U.S.C. § 2462, began running at the time when the alleged fraud occurred, not when the alleged
fraud was discovered. 217 Chief Justice Roberts delivered the unanimous
opinion of the Court in the case. 218
In 2014, the Roberts Court returned to interpreting SLUSA again
in Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice. 219 In that case, the Court held
that for purposes of federal preemption under SLUSA, a fraudulent
misrepresentation or omission is not made “in connection with” a purchase or sale of a covered security under SLUSA unless that misrepresentation is material to one or more individuals in the purchase or sale
of that security. 220 As a result of this holding, the Court permitted four
class actions against alleged fraudsters to proceed in state court.221 Justice Stephen Breyer wrote the majority opinion of the Court, which
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg, Kagan, Scalia, Sotomayor,
and Thomas joined. 222 Although Justice Thomas joined the majority
opinion, he also filed a concurring opinion to state his belief that the
phrase “in connection with” is to be construed broadly, and that the
majority opinion was in conformance with SLUSA’s statutory design.223
Justice Kennedy authored a dissenting opinion that was joined by
Justice Alito that argued that SLUSA should have preempted the class
actions that were at issue in the case. 224
Finally, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 225 the Court examined the jurisdiction of federal courts to hear
securities regulation cases. 226 To determine when the exclusive grant of
jurisdiction applies, the Court held that the test under the general
federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, should be applied, i.e. exclusive jurisdiction is granted to federal courts in regard to actions “arising
under” federal law. 227 Writing for a majority that included Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kennedy, Justice
Elena Kagan explained that “§ 27’s jurisdictional test matches the one

217. Id. at 1224.
218. Id. at 1218.
219. 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014).
220. Id. at 1066.
221. Id. at 1071–72.
222. Id. at 1061.
223. Id. at 1072 (Thomas, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 1072–74 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
225. 136 S. Ct. 1562 (2016).
226. Id. at 1566.
227. Id. at 1569–70.
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we have formulated for § 1331, as applied to cases involving the Exchange Act. If (but only if) such a case meets the ‘arising under’ standard, § 27 commands that it go to federal court.” 228 This holding abrogated opinions from the Second Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Ninth Circuit, and it allowed the class action brought by the stockholders in state
court to proceed in state court. 229 Justice Thomas filed a concurring
opinion that Justice Sotomayor joined that would have also remanded
the case strictly on the language of section 27.230
D.

The Outer Limits of Securities Regulation

In addition to the unrealized landmark opinions, the cases that have
involved tinkering with core substantive issues of securities law, and
the cases related to securities litigation procedure, the Roberts Court
has also decided two cases on the periphery of securities law, Free
Enterprise Fund and Lawson. 231 While these cases are important, they
are far outside the heartland of traditional securities regulation. A few
words, however, ought to be said about both of these opinions.
In Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board, 232 the Court examined the constitutionality of the creation and
design of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (Board)
under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. 233 The Board was created to
have oversight over every accounting firm that audits companies under
the federal securities laws. 234 Concerns arose about the design of the
Board and an accounting firm and nonprofit brought an action in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia challenging
its creation. 235 The Supreme Court held that the district court originally
hearing the case had jurisdiction despite section 25 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, which grants courts of appeals the ability to
challenge final orders or rules of the SEC, because section 25 did not
grant the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction. 236 The Supreme Court
also held that for-cause limitations on the removal of members of the
Board were constitutionally impermissible because they contravened
228. Id. at 1570.
229. See id. at 1567 n.1 (distinguishing the Third Circuit’s approach from the
approaches adopted by the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits).
230. Id. at 1575–76 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
231. Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014); Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co.
Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
232. Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. 477.
233. Id. at 487–88.
234. Id. at 484–87.
235. Id. at 487.
236. Id. at 489.
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the Constitution’s separation of powers. 237 In addition, the Court held
that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act authorizing the SEC to appoint members
of the Public Company Oversight Board did not violate the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. 238 The majority opinion was authored
by Chief Justice John Roberts and was joined by Justices Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas. 239 Justice Breyer authored a dissent that was
joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Stevens. 240
The Court in Lawson v. FMR LLC 241 addressed the scope of
whistleblower protection under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 242 The portion
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a), at issue in the case
was designed to protect whistleblowers who reported securities violations being perpetrated in public companies. 243 The Court interpreted
this provision to protect employees of private contractors and subcontractors serving public companies. 244 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg
wrote the opinion of the Court, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Breyer and Kagan. 245 Justice Antonin Scalia
authored a concurring opinion, which was joined by Justice Thomas,
that endorsed the Court’s textual interpretation of the provision, but
he objected to the Court’s resorting to the legislative history. 246 In
addition, Justice Sonia Sotomayor authored a dissent, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, that argued that the provision should be
interpreted more narrowly based on its text, context, and purpose. 247

II. The Roberts Court as Museum Curator and Its
Impact on Securities Regulation
In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 248 Justice Rehnquist
famously wrote: “When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5,
we deal with a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a
237. Id. at 492.
238. Id. at 510–13.
239. Id. at 482.
240. Id. at 514 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
241. 134 S. Ct. 1158 (2014).
242. Id. at 1161.
243. Id. at 1163.
244. Id. at 1175–76.
245. Id. at 1160.
246. Id. at 1176 (Scalia, J., concurring in principal part and concurring in the
judgment).
247. Id. at 1177–78 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
248. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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legislative acorn.” 249 This is likely the most famous analogy in federal
securities regulation because of the importance of the implied private
right of action in securities litigation, 250 and because the scope of that
private right of action has regularly grown and been pruned through
litigation. 251 The Roberts Court, for example, has already heard numerous cases involving the private right of action under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5. 252 Beyond its broad scope, the reason why the implied
private right of action has yielded so much litigation is because it is
judicially implied, and as Justice Scalia accurately put it in his concurrence to Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilberson
while talking about defining the contours of the implied private right
of action: “We are imagining here.” 253 Despite the fact that the oak
analogy has been widely used, it is no longer accurate. A tree is a growing living organism that needs to be cultivated, fertilized and pruned.
To the Roberts Court, the private right of action and the other core
issues of securities regulation are relics from past decades.
In regard to the Roberts Court and its treatment of securities regulation, the better comparison is to a museum curator, rather than an
arborist. As evidenced by the unrealized landmark opinions, the Court
249. Id. at 737.
250. The legislative history of section 10(b) evidences that Congress drafted the
provision as a “catch-all.” Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the
H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 115 (1934)
(statement of Thomas G. Corcoran, Counsel, Reconstruction Finance Corporation) (“[Section 10(b)] is a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative
devices[.] I do not think there is any objection to that kind of a clause. The
Commission should have the authority to deal with new manipulative devices.”). The Supreme Court has recognized this purpose of section 10(b) in
numerous opinions. See, e.g., Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 382 (1983) (describing section 10(b) as a “‘catchall’ anti-fraud provision”);
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (same); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 203 (1976) (same).
251. See Jill E. Fisch, As Time Goes By: New Questions About the Statute of
Limitations for Rule 10b-5, 61 Fordham L. Rev. S101, S101 (1993) (“There
are dozens of Supreme Court decisions and perhaps thousands of lower court
opinions addressing problems of statutory interpretation that arise in
connection with private rights of action under section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange
Commission . . . .”) (citations omitted); James D. Gordon III, Acorns and
Oaks: Implied Rights of Action Under the Securities Acts, 10 Stan. J.L.
Bus. & Fin. 62, 62 (2004) (reporting that “federal courts have issued
thousands of decisions defining the scope of th[e] private right of action”
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
252. See supra Part I (surveying securities regulation and the Roberts Court, and
discussing a large number of cases involving the private right of action under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5).
253. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 366
(1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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has been unwilling to expand or contract the current scope of federal
securities law. 254 Unlike previous iterations of the Court, the Roberts
Court has expressed no interest in sculpting securities law for purposes
of advancing any particular theory of market regulation. The Court is
willing to do restoration work and fill in gaps when cracks appear, as
evidenced by its inclination to tinker with core substantive issues of
securities law. 255 Through its willingness to address issues of securities
litigation procedure, the Court has also been willing to answer issues
relating to access to federal courts similar to a curator establishing
operating hours of a museum and deciding issues of gallery entrance.256
Finally, the Court has offered a couple of cases that are special exhibitions because they are at the periphery of securities law. 257
A number of implications of the Roberts Court acting as museum
curator in the area of securities regulation exist that should be explored.
First, the Roberts Court’s approach to securities regulation has brought
to an end the Second Circuit being the leading court in the field of
securities law, and it has also brought to an end the practice of previous
iterations of the Court of using the circuit courts as laboratories to
develop securities regulation generally. In addition, the current approach by the Roberts Court leads to the entrenchment of bad precedent
that needs to be discarded. Finally, the most obvious implication of the
Roberts Court’s approach to securities law is that the Roberts Court is
not pro-business in the realm of securities regulation because of the
absence of a regulatory agenda whether it be pro-business, pro-management, pro-investor, or pro-market. Each of these implications will be
examined in turn.
A. The Death of the Mother Court and the Lower Court
Laboratories Approach

Albert Camus’s L’étranger begins with the following sentence:
“Aujourd’hui, maman est morte,” which can be translated as “Today,
mother is dead.” 258 Although this sentence refers to the death of the
narrator’s mother in the novel, the same sentence could have been
uttered when Chief Justice Roberts took his seat on the Court on September 29, 2005. In his dissenting opinion in Blue Chip Stamps, Justice
254. See supra Part I.A (discussing the unrealized landmark opinions by the
Roberts Court relating to securities regulation).
255. See supra Part I.B (discussing the opinions by the Roberts Court involving
tinkering with core substantive issues of securities regulation).
256. See supra Part I.C (discussing the opinions by the Roberts Court addressing
securities litigation procedure).
257. See supra Part I.D (discussing the opinions by the Roberts Court addressing
the outer limits of securities regulation).
258. Albert Camus, L’étranger 9 (Gallimard ed., 1942).
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Harry Blackmun famously referred to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit as the “Mother Court” in the field of
securities regulation. 259 Notably, Justice John Paul Stevens in his concurrence in Morrison went so far as to continue the “judicial oak”
analogy penned by Justice Rehnquist, when Justice Stevens declared
Judge Henry Friendly of the Second Circuit to be the “master arborist”
of the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b5. 260 Historically, the Supreme Court has used the lower courts in general as laboratories for experimenting with and developing securities
law. 261 For example, the implied right of action under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 was originally recognized in 1946 by the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Kardon v.
National Gypsum Company. 262 Twenty five years after Kardon, the
Supreme Court finally held in Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers
Life & Casualty Co.263 in a single sentence in footnote nine of the opinion: “It is now established that a private right of action is implied
under § 10(b).” 264 Similarly, the purchaser-seller requirement, one of the
most important limitations on the implied private right of action under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, was announced by the Second Circuit in
1952 in Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. 265 The Supreme Court waited
until 1975 in Blue Chip Stamps to confirm its existence. 266
259. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
260. Morrison v. Natl. Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 276 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
261. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L.
Rev. 1589, 1640 (1999) (“Another consequence of the infrequency with
which the Supreme Court decides securities law issues is that the ballgame
typically is not the specific pronouncement the Supreme Court makes [in] a
given case, but how that pronouncement is interpreted, extended, and/or
restricted by the lower courts.”) (citation omitted); Donald C. Langevoort,
Words from on High About Rule 10b-5: Chiarella’s History, Central Bank’s
Future, 20 Del. J. Corp. L. 865, 865 (1995) (“A securities law decision by
the United States Supreme Court is an extraordinary event . . . . Adjudication of securities law disputes is a task reserved almost exclusively for the
lower courts and, to a lesser extent, SEC administrative proceedings.”).
262. 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
263. 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
264. Id. at 13 n.9 (citation omitted). Remarkably, the Supreme Court did not
even interpret section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 until 1969. SEC v. Nat’l Sec.,
Inc., 393 U.S. 453, 465 (1969) (“Although § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 may well
be the most litigated provisions in the federal securities laws, this is the first
time this Court has found it necessary to interpret them.”).
265. 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir. 1952).
266. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 748–49 (1975).
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The Roberts Court has ended the Second Circuit’s role as the
“Mother Court” and the lower court laboratories approach in regard to
the development of securities law in favor of maintaining and entrenching existing precedent and respecting the separation of powers established by the Constitution. In cases such as Dabit, Billing, Merck,
Morrison, Simmonds, Gabelli, Amgen, Manning, and Salman, the Roberts Court abrogated case law from the Second Circuit. 267 The Roberts
Court still does rely on the Second Circuit on rare occasion. For example, in Jones v. Harris Associates, 268 the Court relied heavily on

267. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427–28 (2016) (abrogating United
States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014) on the ground that tippertippee liability can be created solely based upon a tipper making a gift of
material nonpublic confidential information to a trading relative or a friend);
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Manning, 136 S. Ct. 1562,
1575 (2016) (abrogating Barbara v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 99 F.3d
49 (2d Cir. 1996) on the ground that in determining when an exclusive grant
of federal jurisdiction applies to a case involving the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, the correct test is the one under the general federal question statute,
28 U.S.C. § 1331, i.e. exclusive jurisdiction is granted to federal courts in
regard to actions “arising under” federal law); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret.
Plans & Tr. Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196, 1198–99 (2013) (abrogating In re
DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623 (2d Cir. 2011) on the ground that proof
of materiality is not a prerequisite to certification of a class employing the
fraud on the market presumption under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5);
Gabelli v. SEC, 133 S. Ct. 1216, 1224 (2013) (reversing the Second Circuit
on the ground that the statute of limitations, found in 28 U.S.C. § 2462,
begins running at the time when an alleged fraud occurs under section 80b-6
of the Investment Advisor Act of 1940, not when the alleged fraud was discovered); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Simmonds, 132 S. Ct. 1414, 1421
n.7 (2012) (abrogating Litzler v. CC Investments, L.D.C., 362 F.3d 203 (2d
Cir. 2004) on the ground that the two-year statute of limitations on causes
of action under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 should
not be tolled beyond when the plaintiff was aware or should have been aware
of the facts providing the basis for disgorgement); Morrison v. Natl. Austl.
Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 265 (2010) (abrogating decades of precedent for the
Second Circuit and other circuit courts regarding the extraterritorial application of the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5);
Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 653 (2010) (abrogating Shah
v. Meeker, 435 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006) on the ground that the statute of
limitations for private rights for an action for security fraud should run from
the time when a plaintiff discovers the facts constituting the violation or
when “a reasonably diligent plaintiff would have ‘discover[ed] the facts constituting the violation’”); Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S.
264, 285 (2007) (reversing a Second Circuit opinion on the ground that securities law should have precluded the antitrust claims in the case); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 89 (2006) (vacating
a Second Circuit opinion written by Judge Sonia Sotomayor on the ground
that SLUSA’s preemptive power should be interpreted broadly).
268. 559 U.S. 335 (2010).
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Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 269 to determine
the proper standard for when an investment advisor breaches its fiduciary duties under section 36(b) of the Investment Company Act of
1940 by charging fees that are too high to manage an investor’s mutual
fund. 270 In Haliburton I, the Court also agreed with In re Salomon
Analyst Metromedia Litigation 271 in reaching its holding that plaintiffs
need not prove loss causation for purposes of class certification under
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 272 Based on the number of instances in
which the Roberts Court has abrogated the holdings of the Second
Circuit in securities regulation cases, however, the Second Circuit is no
longer the “Mother Court” in the development of securities law. This is
especially true because in Morrison, one of the unrealized landmark
opinions, the Roberts Court expressly rejected over four decades of
precedent that had originated in the Second Circuit regarding the extraterritorial application of federal securities law. 273 In addition, the Court
in Salman, another unrealized landmark opinion, rejected the Second
Circuit’s attempt to create better defined and more logical limits for

269. 694 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1982).
270. Jones, 559 U.S. at 351–53.
271. 544 F.3d 474, 483 (2d Cir. 2008).
272. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co. (Halliburton I), 563 U.S. 804,
809 (2011).
273. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 261 (“Rather than guess anew in each case, we apply
the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable background against which
Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”). See Daniel S. Kahn, The
Collapsing Jurisdictional Boundaries of the Antifraud Provisions of the U.S.
Securities Laws: The Supreme Court and Congress Ready to Redress Forty
Years of Ambiguity, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 365, 372–73 (2010) (“The Second
Circuit was the first to address the application of the antifraud provision to
a partially foreign transaction in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, where the court
applied an effects test to assert jurisdiction, and then again four years later
in Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, where the court
applied a nascent version of the conduct test to assert jurisdiction.”) (citations
omitted); Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between
Statutes and Unwritten Law, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 714–15 (2013)
(“Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd . . . swept away the conduct and
effects tests that the Second Circuit had developed to determine the transnational reach of the antifraud provisions in federal securities laws.”); see
also Franklin A. Gevurtz, An Introduction to the Symposium and an Examination of Morrison’s Impact on the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,
27 Pac. McGeorge Global Bus. & Dev. L.J. 173, 178 (2014) (“The
combination of Schoenbaum and Leasco created what became known as the
conduct and effects test to determine the reach of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5 with respect to securities fraud having a transnational dimension. . . . The
test spread from the Second Circuit to the other circuits, albeit with some
differences.”) (citations omitted).
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the scope of tipper-tippee liability under the prohibition against insider
trading based upon section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 274
The court that the Supreme Court now seeks guidance from in
making determinations of key issues of securities regulation is itself. In
each of the Roberts Court unrealized landmark opinions the Court relied heavily upon its own precedent to allow neither expansion nor contraction of the boundaries that it had set for the scope of federal securities law. In Stoneridge, the Court relied heavily upon the rejection of
secondary liability in Central Bank, which had prohibited the expansion
of liability under the implied private right of action under section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 to aiders and abettors. 275 In Morrison, the Court relied
on existing case law from the Court regarding the extraterritorial application of statutes to reach its holding that no extraterritorial application exists under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 276 In Haliburton
II, the Court relied heavily on Basic 277 in making the determination
that the fraud-on-the-market theory still exists to allow class
certification in cases brought under the implied private right of action
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 278 Finally, in Salman, the Court
held that Dirks v. SEC 279 should be the beginning and the end of the
analysis when determining the scope of tipper-tippee liability for insider
trading under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. 280 While the Supreme
Court’s precedent is the obvious place for the Court to begin in looking
for guidance in addressing new issues, the Roberts Court has become
wedded to notions of judicial restraint and modesty, and as a result,
unless Congress acts, securities law is likely to remain static for the
foreseeable future. While the Second Circuit and the other circuit courts
may have some role to play when the Supreme Court tinkers with core
substantive issues of securities regulation, construes securities litigation

274. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016) (“To the extent the
Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends
. . . we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent
with [Supreme Court precedent].” (quoting United States v. Newman, 773
F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014)).
275. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
157–58 (2008); Cent. Bank of Denver v. Interstate Bank of Denver, 511
U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
276. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255, 265.
277. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
278. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct.
2398, 2405 (2014).
279. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
280. Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 427.
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procedure, and addresses issues on the periphery of securities regulation,
a return of the circuit courts creating new securities law is unlikely.
B. The Entrenchment of Well-Constructed and Ill-Constructed Case Law

The current role of the Roberts Court as museum curator could
arguably reflect that security law has finally reached its maturity. As
previously mentioned, the implied private right of action under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 has been heavily litigated because of the lack of
statutory guidance regarding its contours, 281 and this is perhaps best
evidenced by the well-developed and well-litigated test that exists for
the implied private right. 282 Still, in a certain regard, this maturity
seems forced. For example, in Morrison, the Court simply rejected a
large and well-developed body of law from the lower courts regarding
the extraterritorial application of the federal securities law, 283 which
suggested the need for some sort of development of this area of law, if
not by the Court, then Congress.
Examining the cases that the Court has decided, the opinions issued
by the Court have reinforced and entrenched existing case law regardless of whether it has been good or bad precedent. In terms of the unrealized landmark opinions, despite the fact that they have maintained
existing Supreme Court case law, the entrenchment of this case law has
led to some very negative results depending on the quality of the case
law the Roberts Court is relying upon.
The opinion in Salman provides perhaps the best example of the
Roberts Court’s approach to securities regulation leading to bad results. 284 Salman represents a missed opportunity for the Roberts Court
281. See supra notes 248–253 and accompanying text (discussing the extensive
litigation of the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5).
282. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148,
157 (2008) (“In a typical § 10(b) private action a plaintiff must prove (1) a
material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a
connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5)
economic loss; and (6) loss causation.”). This language has been used in
various other Supreme Court opinions. See Halliburton II, 134 S. Ct. at 2407
(providing identical language); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds,
133 S. Ct. 1184, 1192 (2013) (same); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano,
563 U.S. 27, 37–38 (2011) (same).
283. See Morrison v. Natl. Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255–56 (2010) (“This
disregard of the presumption against extraterritoriality did not originate
with the Court of Appeals panel in this case. It has been repeated over many
decades by various Courts of Appeals in determining the application of the
Exchange Act . . . . That has produced a collection of tests for divining what
Congress would have wanted, complex in formulation and unpredictable in
application.”).
284. Salman, 137 S. Ct. 420.

883

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 67·Issue 3·2017
The Supreme Court as Museum Curator

to fine tune and improve insider trading regulation in a way that is
logical and conforms to the language and intent of the statute and the
rule. Unlike the existence of the private right of action under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereupon, which creates substantial separation of powers concerns and is a study in judicial activism, insider trading regulation is a
logical and congressionally authorized extension of these provisions.
Unfortunately, the standard for tipper-tippee liability, which is improperly moored to notions of state fiduciary duties and personal gain, is
not.
In Salman, the Court left untouched the existing test for insider
trading. 285 The problem is that the current test for insider trading is
erroneously founded upon fiduciary duty, and the current test for
tipper-tippee liability is erroneously founded upon notions of personal
gain. In Salman, Justice Alito begins the Court’s unanimous opinion by
stating: “Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Rule 10b–5 prohibit undisclosed
trading on inside corporate information by individuals who are under a
duty of trust and confidence that prohibits them from secretly using
such information for their personal advantage.” 286 This holding embodies the current understanding of insider trading regulation by the
Court that originates from the SEC administrative action, In re Cady,
Roberts & Co. 287 The Court has crystalized the In re Cady, Roberts &
Co. opinion into the following test for insider trading: “(i) the existence
of a relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of
allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by
trading without disclosure.” 288 In Dirks and other opinions, the Court
has held that such a violation occurs in the context of a breach of
fiduciary duty on the part of the insider. 289 In addition, the Court has
clarified that, for section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to apply, a
“manipulation or deception” must have occurred. 290 Dirks also
established the test for tipper-tippee liability:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only

285. Id. at 427.
286. Id. at 423.
287. 40 SEC 907 (1961).
288. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
289. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654 (1983); Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–29.
290. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 654.
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when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the tippee
knows or should know that there has been a breach. 291

In attempting to clarify when a tipper has committed a breach of fiduciary duty, the Court held that “the test is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.” 292 From
this holding, the issues that beget Salman ensued.
The problem is that the Supreme Court uncharacteristically provided too much guidance in the area of insider trading regulation. In
developing this area of law, the Court needlessly imported the complex
and evolving web of fiduciary duty law into insider trading regulation.
Because fiduciary duty law is determined by the state, this creates questions of which notions of fiduciary duties to follow. Even if one chooses
to focus on Delaware, a lot has happened since 1983 when Dirks was
decided, including the dramatic expansion of the duty of care in Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 293 the ability to eliminate the duty of care using section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Incorporation Law, 294 the unearthing
of the duty of good faith in cases such as In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litigation, 295 and the reimagination of the duty of loyalty in
cases such as Stone v. Ritter. 296 Considering how much fiduciary duty
law has evolved since Dirks and how much it is likely to evolve in the
future, one must wonder why the Roberts Court continues to build on
this unstable foundation for insider trading regulation. This is especially
true when the Court in Dirks acknowledged that deception is at the
core of an insider trading violation, rather than a breach of fiduciary

291. Id. at 660.
292. Id. at 662.
293. 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (analyzing the scope of “a director’s duty
to exercise an informed business judgment” as an aspect of the duty of care).
294. See John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, Good Faith and the Ability of
Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law
as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar
Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 Del. J. Corp. L. 111, 113 (2004) (“Section
102(b)(7) first appeared in the [Delaware General Corporation Law] in 1986,
in response to the declining availability of adequate directors’ and officers’
liability insurance created in the wake of Smith v. Van Gorkom, a case where
the Delaware Supreme Court upheld a finding that directors breached their
fiduciary duty of care in connection with the approval of an acquisition.”)
(citations omitted).
295. 906 A.2d 27, 64–67 (Del. 2006) (examining the definition of the duty of
good faith under Delaware law).
296. 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006) (identifying the duty to act in good faith
as a part of the duty of loyalty).
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duty. 297 Similarly, one must wonder why the Roberts Court is hanging
onto the personal benefit language in Dirks when it has proven unworkable and left open so many questions. 298
The Court could have adopted the following approach, which I have
developed. First, the Court could have retained the Cady, Roberts rule,
and rather than requiring a breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the
insider, the Court could have held that “unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take advantage of that information by trading without
disclosure” 299 exists only when the insider has recklessly, knowingly, or
intentionally obtained the information through deception. Second, rather than requiring any analysis of personal benefit, the Court could
have held that tipper-tippee liability exists when the tippee knows or
should have known that the tipper has recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally obtained the information through deception. Such deception
could include breaching company policies mandating that such information be kept secret, and those policies could be trumped by ethical
and legal obligations to disclose, such as those that animated Secrist to
disclose in Dirks, 300 which means that my proposal would keep the result
in Dirks the same.
Such an approach is truer to the underlying purpose of the federal
securities law. As the Supreme Court held in SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 301 the “fundamental purpose” underlying both
the Securities Act and the Exchange Act is “to substitute a philosophy
of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve

297. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 653–54.
298. See Ronald J. Colombo, Tipping the Scales Against Insider Trading: Adopting a Presumption of Personal Benefit to Clarify Dirks, 45 Hofstra L.
Rev. 117, 145 (2016) (“U.S. securities law suffers from a number of vexing
difficulties, one of which is the proper understanding and application of the
Supreme Court’s personal benefit test as set forth in Dirks.”); Jill E. Fisch
& Hillary A. Sale, The Securities Analyst as Agent: Rethinking the Regulation
of Analysts, 88 Iowa L. Rev. 1035, 1060–61 (2003) (“[I]t is unclear what
type of personal benefit is necessary after Dirks.”); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Martha Stewart and the Forbidden Fruit: A New Story of Eve, 2009
Mich. St. L. Rev. 1017, 1040 (“Among other things, the need to meet the
personal-benefit requirement, the nature of the personal benefit that may
trigger tipper/tippee liability, and whether the tipper must actually receive
a personal benefit or intend to receive a personal benefit in giving material
nonpublic information to the alleged tippee are unclear issues [under the
standard created by Dirks], especially where the tipper is a misappropriator
rather than a classical insider (e.g., an officer or director of the corporation
that issued the securities that are traded by the tippee).”).
299. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 (1980).
300. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648–49.
301. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.” 302 This
“fundamental purpose” is founded upon elimination of deception in the
purchase and sale of securities, rather than eliminating breaches of fiduciary duty. 303
In addition, a deception based theory of insider trading is also more
in keeping with the history and intent of Rule 10b-5. Milton Freeman
has famously recounted the thinness of the drafting history of Rule 10b5 as follows:
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I
don’t remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch.
We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All
the commissioners read the rule and they tossed it on the table,
indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner Pike
who said, “Well,” he said, “we are against fraud, aren’t we?” That
is how it happened. 304

What this quotation evidences is that Rule 10b-5 was designed to prevent fraud and deception in the purchase and sale of securities, which
means that grafting requirements onto Rule 10b-5 for breaches of fiduciary duty and personal benefit are unnecessary and inappropriate.
My approach would provide better notice to investors regarding
what is rendered unlawful by insider trading regulation, which helps to
address the Due Process and Rule of Lenity concerns with the existing
state of regulation. 305 My approach prevents investors from feeling obligated to keep up with complex and convoluted insider trading law
because they already have an understanding of what deception is. In
addition, foreign investors better understand their obligations because,
while they likely understand what constitutes a deception, fiduciary
duty regulation in the United States may feel very foreign to them.

302. Id. at 186.
303. Id.
304. Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. Law. 891, 922
(1967).
305. See Kathleen Coles, The Dilemma of the Remote Tippee, 41 Gonz. L. Rev.
181, 235 (2006) (“Regardless of whether the lack of clarity in the insider
trading rules is sufficient at this point to justify overturning on constitutional
grounds a set of tests that have been in place for decades, it remains troubling from a policy standpoint that increasing civil and criminal penalties are
being imposed where the laws remain so expansive, complicated, inconsistent,
and unclear.”); J. Kelly Strader, (Re)Conceptualizing Insider Trading:
United States v. Newman and the Intent to Defraud, 80 Brook. L. Rev.
1419, 1484 (2015) (“Insider trading law raises concerns endemic to white
collar criminalization: due process vagueness and the concurrent risk of
overcriminalization.”).
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Salman represents a missed opportunity to fine tune and improve
insider trading regulation in a way that is logical and conforms to the
language and intent of the statute and the rule. The question of whether
the entrenchment by the Roberts Court of existing precedent in other
cases is problematic is more open. In Haliburton II, for example, the
Court affirmed the existence and application of the fraud-on-the-market
theory to the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, 306 despite the fact that the fraud-on-the-market theory is
founded upon questionable economic theory that some view as being
discredited. 307 In addition, in Morrison, the Court rejected four decades
of well-developed lower court precedent regarding the extraterritorial
application of the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, 308 despite the fact that the private right could have a role to play
in policing the emerging global securities markets. 309 And, in Stoneridge,
the Court rejected a theory of “scheme liability,” 310 despite the fact that
this theory could help in policing securities transactions. 311 Each of these
306. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2413 (2014).
307. See William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Political Economy of
Fraud on the Market, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 69, 72 (2011) (“The fraud-on-themarket (FOTM) cause of action just doesn’t work.”); Michael J. Kaufman
& John M. Wunderlich, Fraud Created the Market, 63 Ala. L. Rev. 275,
306 (2012) (“[T]he premise of the fraud-on-the-market theory, the efficientmarket hypothesis, has been heavily criticized. Proponents of behavioral
finance observe irrationality in investor behavior and argue that markets are
in the main inefficient.”); Saul Zipkin, A Common Law Court in a
Regulatory World, 74 Ohio St. L.J. 285, 317 (2013) (“The fraud-on-themarket theory has been criticized by numerous commentators, for a variety
of reasons . . . .”) (citation omitted).
308. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).
309. See Eric C. Chaffee, A Call for Legislative Reform: Expanding the Extraterritorial Application of the Private Rights of Action under Federal Securities
Law while Limiting the Scope of the Relief Available, 22 Stan. J.L. Bus. &
Fin. (forthcoming 2017) (discussing the role that the private right of action
under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 could play in helping to regulate the
emerging international securities markets).
310. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159–
60 (2008).
311. See Melissa C. Nunziato, Comment, Aiding and Abetting, a Madoff Family
Affair: Why Secondary Actors Should be Held Accountable for Securities
Fraud through the Restoration of the Private Right of Action for Aiding and
Abetting Liability under the Federal Securities Laws, 73 Alb. L. Rev. 603,
643 (2010) (“Congress should restore the right of private litigants to bring
aiding and abetting claims. Its failure to do so would encourage and perpetuate further fraudulent conduct in the market, thereby injuring investor
confidence.”); Jamie Heine, The Whittling Away of the Private Right of
Action under Rule 10b-5: The PSLRA, Janus, and the Financial Crisis, 48
Creighton L. Rev. 23, 62 (2014) (“Providing for a private right of action
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cases potentially represent a missed opportunity for meaningful change
in federal securities regulation that was thwarted at least in part based
on the Roberts Court being wedded to existing Supreme Court precedent.
Whether this evidences judicial modesty, respecting the role of Congress, or something else is hard to say. The Roberts Court approach
could evidence a belief that Congress will legislate when necessary in
the area of securities regulation. Congress enacted the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) and the Securities Litigation
Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA) relatively close to the time
when Chief Justice Roberts took his seat on the Court on September
29, 2005. 312 In regard to Stoneridge, for example, the Roberts Court’s
holding was based largely upon the Supreme Court’s holding in Central
Bank, which made clear that no secondary liability exists based upon
the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b5. 313 Notably, just after Central Bank was handed down by the Court,
Congress enacted section 104 of the PSLRA, which created section 20(e)
of the Securities Exchange Act that provides the government the ability
to prosecute aiding and abetting violations of section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5, but it did not grant or provide parties the ability to sue.314
Similarly, Morrison abrogated over four decades of precedent from the
lower courts about applying a conduct and effects test to determine the
extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 315 and speaking for the majority in that case,
for secondary liability both deters primary actors from committing securities
fraud, since gatekeepers are more likely to prevent the primary actor from
making fraudulent statements and to report those statements if they are
made, and deters aiders and abettors from participating in fraud schemes,
since they could face liability not only from the SEC but from every shareholder they defraud.”); Mark Klock, Improving the Culture of Ethical Behavior in the Financial Sector: Time to Expressly Provide for Private Enforcement Against Aiders and Abettors of Securities Fraud, 116 Penn St.
L. Rev. 437, 446 (2011) (“There were, and still are, strong policy arguments
supporting the doctrine of private action liability for aiding and abetting
violations of securities laws.”).
312. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105–353,
112 Stat. 3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Biographies of Current
Justices, supra note 2.
313. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157–58; Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994).
314. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012) (providing that the SEC has the power to bring
actions against individuals aiding and abetting securities violations under the
Exchange Act).
315. Morrison v. Natl. Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255–61 (2010).
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Justice Scalia wrote: “Rather than guess anew in each case [involving
the extraterritorial application of federal securities law], we apply the
presumption [against the extraterritorial reach] in all cases, preserving
a stable background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.” 316 Remarkably, in response to this implicit challenge
from Court to legislate, when President Barack Obama signed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act317
(Dodd-Frank Act) on July 21, 2010, Congress reinstated the SEC’s and
DOJ’s extraterritorial jurisdiction by adopting a conduct and effects
approach in section 929P of the Act. 318 Moreover, Congress demonstrated a willingness to consider extending the extraterritorial application of the private rights of action under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 by mandating a study of the issue by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission. 319
Perhaps, the Court now feels that it can rely upon Congress to do
its job in regard to sculpting federal securities regulation, or, perhaps,
Chief Justice Roberts has been able to guide the Court to take a more
modest role, which is something for which he advocated during his confirmation hearings. 320 Regardless, while one can argue that the Roberts
Court’s decision to maintain the status quo in regard to the private
right of action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 in cases such as
Stoneridge and Morrison, evidences proper judicial restraint, the neglect of insider trading regulation is disturbing, especially considering
the criminal penalties and social scorn that are associated with insider
trading accusations.
C.

The Lack of a Pro-Business Bias

This Article would be incomplete if it failed to include some analysis
of whether the Roberts Court has a pro-business bias in regard to cases
involving securities law. The debate over whether the Roberts Court is
pro-business is almost as old as the Roberts Court itself. Shortly after
316. Id.
317. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111–203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301).
318. See id. § 929P(b), 124 Stat. at 1864–65 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-47)
(granting federal courts jurisdiction over actions instituted by the SEC alleging
fraudulent “conduct occurring outside the United States that has a
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States”).
319. Id. § 929Y(a), 124 Stat. at 1871 (requiring the SEC to solicit public comment
and conduct a study to determine whether to extend the extraterritorial
application of the private rights of action under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934).
320. See infra note 336 and accompanying text (discussing John Roberts’
comments regarding judicial modesty and respect for the separation of
powers during his confirmation hearings).
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John G. Roberts, Jr. took his seat as Chief Justice of the Court on
September 29, 2005, 321 these claims began to emerge. 322 Commentators
continue to regularly make these assertions. 323 The question of the
validity of these claims is a complex one that requires the untangling
of a myriad of issues within a large number of areas of the law. Obviously, in certain areas of the law, businesses have benefited greatly
from the decisions by the Roberts Court. For example, with cases like
Citizens United v. FEC 324 and Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,325
the scope of certain corporate rights has expanded dramatically in the
past decade. 326 The problem is that the definition of “business” is an
elusive one. 327 For example, if you choose to define a business as a profit-

321. Biographies of Current Justices, supra note 2.
322. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Business, the Environment, and the Roberts
Court: A Preliminary Assessment, 49 Santa Clara L. Rev. 943, 943
(2009) (“It did not take long for the Roberts Court to earn its reputation as
a ‘pro-business’ Court. . . . Indeed, some were ready to make this charge
before the current Court had sat two full terms together.”) (citation omitted); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court at Age Three, 54 Wayne L.
Rev. 947, 962 (2008) (“[T]he Roberts Court is the most pro-business Court
of any since the mid-1930s.”); Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before
and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming
the Bar, 96 Geo. L.J. 1487, 1555 (2008) (“The decidedly pro-business tilt of
the Court’s docket and rulings was certainly a major theme of those assessing
the first full Term of the Roberts Court.”); Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Court
Inc., N.Y. Times Mag., Mar. 16, 2008, at 38 (“[E]ver since John Roberts
was appointed chief justice in 2005, the [Supreme Court] has seemed only
more receptive to business concerns.”).
323. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 Minn. L. Rev. 1431, 1431–32 (2013)
(“A number of scholars, journalists, and at least one member of Congress
claim that the current Supreme Court (the ‘Roberts Court’) is more favorable
to business than previous Supreme Courts have been.”) (citation omitted);
Stephen M. Feldman, The End of the Cold War: Can American
Constitutionalism Survive Victory?, 41 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 261, 314 (2015)
(“[F]or corporations, the Roberts Court is the most pro-business Supreme
Court since World War II.”); Deborah C. Malamud, The Strange Persistence
of Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 118 W. Va. L. Rev. 1, 22 (2015)
(“The Roberts Court is marked by a combination of ideological conservatism
and business conservatism: it has a strong pro-business bent.”).
324. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
325. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
326. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365 (holding “the Government may not
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity”);
Burwell, 134 S. Ct. at 2769 (holding that the term “person” in the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act reaches closely held corporations).
327. See Simone M. Haug, The United States Policy of Stringent Anti-TreatyShopping Provisions: A Comparative Analysis, 29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L.
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seeking enterprise, you exclude all of the nonprofit businesses that most
would expect to be incorporated into the definition. Moreover, because
the definition of business is so expansive, it touches a multitude of
different areas of law, which makes it difficult to know where to begin
and end when it comes to analyzing the question of whether the Roberts
Court can be properly characterized as pro-business.
As a result, this Article addresses only whether the Roberts Court
is pro-business in its securities regulation opinions. Because capital is
the life blood of business entities, issues of securities regulation and the
regulation of capital markets are at the heart of beginning to answer
whether the Roberts Court is pro-business. While understanding securities regulation in the Roberts Court does not definitively answer whether the Roberts Court is pro-business, it is a good place to begin.
In the realm of securities regulation, the Roberts Court has not
shown a pro-business bias. Because the Roberts Court has acted as a
museum curator in this area, the Court has not advanced a theory of
market regulation that is pro-business, pro-management, pro-market,
or pro-investor. It has merely done its best to maintain the status quo.
Although one could argue that the Court helped to protect foreign businesses by abrogating case law in Morrison that extended the reach of
federal securities regulation internationally, 328 and that the Court helped to protect businesses by refusing to adopt a theory of scheme regulation in Stoneridge, 329 the Court in Halliburton II refused to destroy
the fraud-on-the-market theory and the presumption of reliance that it
creates, which enables so many class actions to exist against businesses
and their managers. 330 In addition, the Court in Salman rejected making
any clarification of insider trading regulation that might have helped to
better protect insiders, i.e., business people, from engaging in unlawful
behavior. 331 This approach of neither expanding nor contracting the
scope of securities regulation carries through the Roberts Court’s case
law.
The claim that the Roberts Court is pro-business in the area of
securities regulation has no merit. Unlike previous iterations of the Supreme Court, the Roberts Court is not advancing any theory of market
regulation, and as a result, grounds do not exist to claim that the Court
is pro-business in regard to securities regulation because the Roberts
191, 230 (1996) (“[I]t is extremely difficult to define what constitutes an
active trade or business.”) (citation omitted).
328. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 261 (2010).
329. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159–
60 (2008).
330. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (Halliburton II), 134 S. Ct. 2398,
2407 (2014).
331. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016).
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Court is merely acting as a museum curator in this area. 332 Rather than
being pro-business, the behavior of the Roberts Court evidences a
newfound respect in the securities regulation realm for the separation
of powers mandated by the Constitution. Notably, because capital
formation is the foundation to the creation of business entities and securities regulation regulates this process, the conclusion that the Roberts
Court is not pro-business in the area of securities law means that the
argument that the Roberts Court is pro-business generally is built upon
shaky ground.

Conclusion: The Future of The Roberts Court
The future of the Roberts Court is an interesting question. The
themes woven into the tapestry of the Roberts Court are pronounced.
The polarization in the securities law area, as measured by dissents, is
less than it has been during previous iterations of the Court, 333 and the
voting of Justices do not map well to the Justices’ partisan affiliations. 334 All of this demonstrates that the Court is at least facially
relatively stable in regard to its approach to securities regulation.
Whether any of this can really be attributed to Chief Justice Roberts
is difficult to say. Notably, in all twenty-one opinions handed down by
the Court, the Chief Justice has sided with the majority in every opinion in which he has been involved. 335 Whether this reflects the Chief
Justice guiding the Court or a temperamental change of the Court in
general is difficult to say. Both positions likely have some validity. At
his confirmation hearing, Chief Justice Roberts famously declared:
332. Other commentators have reached similar conclusions. See Coates, supra note
10, at 3 (“Inconsistent with any sweeping view that the Roberts Court is ‘probusiness,’ it continues to be significantly more ‘expansive’ in securities-law
cases than the Court was in the ‘restrictive’ Powell era.”); Pritchard, supra
note 7, at 109 (“Does the ‘pro business’ Roberts Court have a negative attitude
toward securities class actions? An examination of the overall pattern of the
Court’s decisions in this area suggests a bias not toward business, but rather,
the status quo, resisting attempts to both restrict—and expand—the reach of
Rule 10b-5 class actions.”).
333. See Coates, supra note 10, at 3 (“[T]he Roberts Court has offered less dissent
in securities and antitrust cases, as measured by minority votes and five-vote
majorities, than prior Courts.”).
334. See Coates, supra note 10, at 22 (“[T]he overall Roberts Court’s securitieslaw case outcomes do not map well the Justices’ partisan affiliations.”).
335. See supra Part I (providing a survey of the securities regulation opinions
issued by the Roberts Court); see also Coates, supra note 10, at 3 (“This
continuation of what one might call an inertial approach to the substance of
securities law is partly attributable to the votes of Roberts himself, who, in his
time as Chief, has been the only Justice that has sided with the majority in
every securities-law decision.”) (citation omitted).
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“Judges are like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply
them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure
everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went
to a ball game to see the umpire.” 336 With a judicial philosophy like
that, one should not be surprised that the Chief Justice has consistently
joined opinions of the Court that maintain existing Supreme Court
precedent with only minor tinkering and clarification of procedural
issues. 337 At least one commentator has credited the Roberts Court’s
willingness to grant certiorari and address securities litigation
procedural issues in part to Chief Justice Roberts own background as
an appellate litigator. 338 To claim that one member of the Court is
responsible for the altitudinal disposition of the Court, however, is
shortsighted. For example, after the passing of Justice Scalia, Justice
Kagan stated: “I think we’re all textualists now in a way that just . . .
was not remotely true when Justice Scalia joined the bench.” 339 If this
is true, it helps to explain why the Court may no longer have the
appetite that it once did for developing securities regulation because so
much of securities litigation focuses on the implied private right of
action under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 that is the product of judicial
imagination. 340
One would have a difficult time predicting when, how, and whether
the Roberts Court’s disposition in regard to securities regulation will
evolve. Filling the seat that was previously occupied by Antonin Scalia
will obviously have an impact on the Court. In terms of the recent
confirmation of Justice Neil Gorsuch, he has publicly stated his disdain
for the implied private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5. For example, in 2005, while Justice Gorsuch was a partner at
Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel prior to his appointment
to the Tenth Circuit, he wrote an opinion column published in The
336. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of John Roberts).
337. See supra Part I (surveying the securities regulation case law of the Roberts
Court).
338. See Coates, supra note 10, at 28 (“[C]omplex procedural standards are part
of Chief Justice Roberts’s personal experience as a Supreme Court litigator.
This background may help explain why the Roberts Court’s decisions have
been marked by a distinct revival of cases in civil procedure, which in turn
may help explain its securities-law decisions.”).
339. Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on
the Reading of Statutes at Harvard Law School, at 8:28 (Nov. 17, 2015),
https://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-kagan-discusses-statutoryinterpretation/ [https://perma.cc/H2ZE-L4XW].
340. See supra Part I (surveying the case law of the Roberts Court involving
securities regulation).
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National Law Journal in which he described class actions under section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 as a “free ride to fast riches enjoyed by securities
class action attorneys in recent years” and that interpreting the private
right narrowly would “curb frivolous fraud claims.” 341 Whether he still
holds these views more than a decade later and how they might
translate into action if he is hard to say. Still, as evidenced by the roles
played by Justice William O. Douglas or Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr a
single Justice can have significant impact on the area of securities
regulation. 342 Of course, at this point, the polarization and partisan bias
of the members of the Court is low, and as a result, any new Justice or
Justices would need to be very persuasive to set change into motion.343
Moreover, in regard to securities regulation, the Roberts Court has been
a study in judicial modesty and respect for the separation of powers. If
Congress would choose to remake securities law in some significant regard, this would create an opportunity for the Court to become a more
active force regarding developing and shaping securities law. PSLRA,
SLUSA, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Dodd-Frank each show that Congress
does choose to act from time to time regarding securities regulation. If
Congress would enact new legislation, the Court’s disposition to
securities regulation could change remarkably. In addition, the SEC
also has power to regulate securities within the scope of authority that
Congress has granted the agency. As a result, a dispositional shift in
the SEC could also create a dispositional shift in the Court depending
on what regulatory and enforcement strategies the SEC chooses to
undertake.
Regardless, the current disposition of the Court is well-established.
This Article is rife with analogies that rely on imagery as diverse as
mosaics, tapestries, oak trees, arborists, and umpires. The one that matters the most, however, is the Roberts Court as a museum curator
because this reflects the current approach by the Court regarding securities regulation. The Roberts Court has decided to preserve relics created by previous iterations of the Court, do minor restoration work as
needed, answer questions of access in relation to securities litigation,
and have the occasional special exhibition at the periphery of securities
law. The implications of this approach include the death of the lower
courts laboratories approach in regard to securities regulation, especially in regard to the Second Circuit, which was previously the “Mother
341. Neil M. Gorsuch & Paul B. Matey, No Loss, No Gain: The Supreme Court
Should Make Clear That Securities Fraud Claims Can’t Dodge the Element of
Causation, Nat’l L.J., Jan. 31, 2005, at 52.
342. See supra note 19 and accompanying text (discussing the experience that
Justice William O. Douglas and Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. brought to the
Court regarding securities regulation).
343. See supra notes 333–335 and accompanying text (discussing the low polarization and partisan bias of members of the Court in cases involving securities
regulation).
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Court” in securities regulation; the entrenchment of good and bad
Supreme Court precedent; and a clear message that the Roberts Court
is not pro-business in the securities regulation realm because the Court
is not pushing any market regulation agenda. While the future remains
open, this role for the Court is well-entrenched, and the narrative of
the Roberts Court is well-developed.
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